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Abstract—The ever-increasingly urban population and its 
material demands have brought an unprecedented burden to cities. 
Smart cities leverage emerging technologies like CR-IoT to 
provide better QoE and QoS for all citizens. However, resource 
allocation is an important problem in CR-IoT. Currently, this 
problem is handled by auction theory or game theory. To make 
CR-IoT nodes smarter and more autonomously allocate resources, 
we propose a multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) 
algorithm to learn the optimal resource allocation strategies in the 
oligopolistic market model. Firstly, we model a multi-agent 
scenario with two primary users (PUs) as sellers and multiple 
secondary users (SUs) as buyers, which is a Bertrand market 
model. Then, we propose the Q-probabilistic multiagent learning 
(QPML) and apply it for allocating resource in a market. In the 
situation of multiagent interaction, the PUs and SUs learn 
strategies to maximize their revenue. Experimental results prove 
our multiagent learning approach performs well and convergence 
also well.  
 
Index Terms—CR-IoT, MARL, resource allocation, market 
model 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ITH the increasing world’s population of cities, there has 
been estimated to increase to over 65 percent by 2050 of 
the total population [1]. Such rapid population growth and 
material demands are bringing an unprecedented burden to 
cities, such as urban infrastructure and social fabric. Therefore, 
for addressing urban resource-strapped, accelerating 
urbanization and creating a livable environment for worldwide 
urban residents, the smart city is proposed [2]. A smart city is 
one which leverages Information Communications Technology 
(ICT) and emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things 
(IoT), cloud computing and big data mining to provide the best 
quality of life for all citizens while minimizing the consumption 
of energy and resources. 
The IoT is regarded as one of the most critical enabling 
technologies in the construction of the smart city. With the 
implementation of smart cities, a large number of various 
devices have been deployed everywhere [3]. According to the 
forecasts [4], more than 50 billion devices will be connected to 
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the IoT by the year 2020, which will provide a seamless 
connection between things and networks in smart cities [5]. 
Accessing so many devices in the IoT is posing many new and 
unprecedented opportunities and challenges, such as the ever-
growing data and ever-increasing demands for spectrum 
resources, as well as the rationality of management and use of 
spectrum resources. If not addressed the above problems, these 
will become the bottleneck of the future IoT and smart city, 
especially the usage problem of spectrum resources [6]. 
Consequently, to solve these problems, many types of research 
have been done in industry and academia. In [6], the CR-IoT is 
proposed, which considers the emerging cognitive radio (CR) 
technology and cognitive radio network (CRN) in the IoT. CR 
enable IoT nodes to intelligently and dynamically manage 
communications themselves, effectively utilize spectrum 
resource, avoid resource waste, and improve spectrum 
efficiency. However, there are still existing some problems in 
real-time resource allocation in CR-IoT, for example, a 
centralized resource allocation mechanism leads to high 
network cost and low resource utilization. From another point 
of view, resources are cost-effective and resource utilization 
should be maximized at the lowest cost (that is, resources are 
no longer wasted). A fully distributed and autonomous resource 
allocation policy should be considered as a feasible solution [7]. 
Therefore, a sophisticated resource allocation mechanism in 
CR-IoT is expected, which in addition to being capable of 
improving resource utilization, can have smarter learning and 
decision-making capabilities to allocate resource by interacting 
with the environment. Up to now, game theory and auction 
theory are two prevalent tools for modeling and analyzing 
interactive decision-making processes. However, these 
approaches not very “smart” in decision-making, which lacks 
autonomy and self-adaptation. Fortunately, the era of artificial 
intelligence (AI) is coming [8]. The AI technologies pave the 
way for resource allocation in CR-IoT, like reinforcement 
learning (RL) method [9]. In this paper, we focus our emphasis 
on the CR-IoT scenario and propose a resource allocation 
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mechanism from a relatively novel perspective - the market 
economy. 
Generally, the market is a natural multi-agent system. As 
illustrated in Fig. 1, we focus on a CR-IoT scenario, which is 
considered as an oligopolistic market from an economic 
perspective. In this paper, from the perspective of the cost and 
benefit of the market economy, we present a market economy 
model of resource allocation. We consider one scenario that 
there are two primary users (PUs) and multiple secondary users 
(SUs) in the Bertrand market. To make CR-IoT nodes 
intelligently and autonomously allocate resources, we propose 
a multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithm to learn 
the optimal resource allocation strategies in the market model. 
To motivate fair allocation and use of resources with a fully 
distributed autonomous manner in CR-IoT. 
Our contributions in this work are as follows. 
(1) We have described the price decision problem of the 
Bertrand market as a distributed multi-agent dynamic resource 
allocation problem; 
(2) We have modeled the two PUs and multiple SUs 
scenario as an oligopolistic market, from the perspective 
economic theory; 
(3) We have analyzed the behaviors of PUs and SUs in the 
multi-agent system; 
(4) We have proposed the Q-probabilistic multi-agent 
learning (QPML) and applied it for allocating resources in the 
Bertrand market. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 briefly introduces the related work of resource allocation in 
CR-IoT. Following that, we expound a multi-agent market 
model design in section 3. Then we propose the Q-probabilistic 
multi-agent learning and applied it for allocating resource in the 
Bertrand market in section 4. Section 5 indicates that the 
performance of our proposed algorithm is better verified by 
experiments. And section 6 concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Resource allocation in CR-IoT is challenging, and a lot of 
works has been done in academia in recent years. In the 
following sections, we first review some of the recent kinds of 
literature that address resource allocation issues in different 
ways. Then, we discuss the latest research on applying artificial 
intelligence (AI) algorithms to solve the resource allocation 
problem.  
A. Game Theory 
Game theory is a powerful mathematical tool for learning 
interactive decision-making processes. It analyzes the 
interaction strategies among players, and each player gains its 
own maximum benefit by game [10]. Nowadays, game theory 
has been widely recognized as a popular tool in many fields 
such as economics, engineering, science and computer science. 
Also, leveraging game theory for CRN resource allocation has 
become a hot research topic. An introduction to the application 
of game theory in CRN is provided in [11], which details the 
most fundamental concepts of game theory and explains how to 
use these concepts in cognitive tasks. Specifically, this paper 
discusses four kinds of game theory methods in spectrum 
sharing, namely non-cooperative games, cooperative games, 
stochastic games, economic games. A detailed overview of 
cooperative game and non-cooperative game model 
applications in CR spectrum allocation is presented in [12]. In 
a similar literature, a non-cooperative spectrum sharing games 
in CRN has been discussed in [13], such as repeated game, 
potential game and supermodular game. A resource allocation 
based on game theory for distributed implementation has been 
presented in [14], mainly considering the potential games and 
coexistence problems of two wireless networks operating on the 
same spectrum. In addition, in [12], a spectrum trading was also 
discussed. It formulates the game problem between the primary 
user and multiple secondary users, with the theory of 
evolutionary game and non-cooperative game. In addition, 
game theory has been used to address resource allocation issues 
in various scenarios of the IoT, like device-to-device (D2D) 
communication scenarios [15]. 
B. Auction Theory 
Auction theory and its application are an important branch of 
economics and now be used to solve various engineering 
problems [16]. During the auction, the buyers submit the bids 
and sellers submit the sale. The actual item or service can be 
regarded as the auction commodity. Then trade according to the 
preferences of buyers and sellers. The auction can be designed 
for different types of radio resource allocation issues [17], such 
as a reverse auction, double auction and combinatorial auction 
all can be used for a different scenario. Joint spectrum 
allocation and relay allocation are modeled as hierarchical 
auctions in [18]. Moreover, the two auction mechanisms are 
proposed to improve spectrum utilization and increase the use 
of spatial diversity in the CRNs. In addition, auction theory can 
be combined with game theory and applied to dynamic resource 
allocation problems. In [19], the author presented an auction-
based approach that uses game theory mechanism in a non-
cooperative environment and repeats the game with incomplete 
information to determine bidders in the auction, thereby making 
resource provider to obtain maximum benefits and users obtain 
the resources they need. 
Both of the above methods are derived from the perspective 
 
Fig. 1. A CR-IoT scenario of two primary users (PUs) and multiple secondary 
users (SUs). This scenario is considered as an oligopolistic market. 
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of economics and can be used to solve the problem of dynamic 
resource allocation in cognitive wireless networks. Game 
theory tends to study the behavioral strategies of agents to 
maximize the benefits. However, the auction theory is more 
commercial and more dependent on market factors. The auction 
is usually designed to address resource allocation issues. From 
the perspective of economics, as the number of agents continues 
to increase, the ability to rationally allocate resources using 
these two methods will continue to decline due to inadequate 
adaptability and self-organization capabilities. 
C. Reinforcement Learning  
Recently, the emerging technology reinforcement learning 
also has decision-making capability, which is similar to the two 
approaches above. RL is a dynamic online learning method, 
which mainly includes single-agent reinforcement learning 
(SARL) and multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) [20]. 
Researchers widely use the SARL to solve resource allocation 
problems in CRN, such as spectrum sensing, spectrum 
management and spectrum resource allocation [21]-[23].  
A multi-layer cooperative mechanism has been proposed in 
[24], which uses the popular method RL, Q-learning. In [25], a 
market-based resource allocation mechanism is proposed that 
uses demand functions to give agents an allocation preference. 
In addition, a probabilistic reinforcement learning has been 
proposed in [26]. From the perspective of economics, the 
monopolistic market model is modelled to solve the resource 
allocation problem of one PU and multiple SUs in CR. However, 
although the RL algorithm has good performance in CRN, 
numerous communication scenarios are multi-agent systems. 
Therefore, the method of SARL is not enough to meet the 
demand. Therefore, the multi-agent approach is expected to 
solve the resource allocation problem of multi-agent scenarios. 
The [27] proposed a MARL method to common-pool resource 
appropriation to predict spatial and temporal resource dynamics 
allocation.  
Although there are three common methods for resource 
allocation in CRN, the self-adaptation and autonomy of RL-
based methods still need to be improved. In the CR-IoT network, 
the intelligent control and distributed methods should be 
presented to solve the resource allocation problem in 
sophisticated scenarios. 
III. MODEL DESIGN AND USERS’ BEHAVIORS ANALYSIS 
Different from the aforementioned works, we consider the 
scenario where two adjacent PUs have spectrum resources in a 
market. Meanwhile, there are many SUs bid to meet their own 
resource needs. In this section, we first briefly introduce the 
market model and then discuss the behaviors of PUs and SUs 
in the multi-agent system (MAS) model.  
A. The Oligopolistic market Model for CR-IoT  
Generally, the market is a sophisticated multi-agent 
environment, which is a mixture of monopolistic and 
oligopolistic markets. With the emergence of the CR-IoT 
networks, the capabilities of agents and network nodes have 
improved and became smarter. The users of CR-IoT are more 
likely to voluntarily send requests to get resources instead of 
waiting for resource allocation. Hence, we study the 
phenomenon of multi-agent interaction in a market economy 
model, in which the network nodes have the capability of 
making decisions about resources. 
The market environment is a natural multi-agent system with 
a variety of interesting agents. When it comes to market, the 
competition and allocation of resources is a universal 
phenomenon. Based on the economic aspects of resource 
allocation market, the prices of resources are important, which 
decide whether to exchange resources. Inspired by economic 
theory and market model approach, we consider the allocation 
problem of the CR-IoT resource as a market problem, where 
PUs are regarded as sellers and SUs are regarded as buyers. 
Under the market, the PUs specify prices for their spectrum 
resources, and SUs also give bids to fulfil their own needs. The 
PUs and SUs actively update prices and bids according to 
behaviors and environmental changes, while learning the best 
resource allocation strategy. SUs bid on the resource and PUs 
decide whether to sell resources according to the bids of SUs. 
The scenario is illustrated in Fig.2, in this market, feedbacks are 
generated continuously between PUs and SUs during the 
interaction process. During the learning process, the PUs update 
prices based on feedback from SUs, and the SUs also update the 
bids according to the prices of the resources designed by PUs. 
The prices of all PUs will reach an equilibrium, which will 
balance the market revenue. The motivation of this paper is to 
propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning method to 
establish a model and allocate resources. Next, in this section, 
we will discuss the oligopolistic model involving PUs and SUs. 
B. Problem Definition in Market Model 
As mentioned previously, the Bertrand market model can be 
used to balance market resources and prices. When the CR-IoT 
environment is regarded as markets, the network nodes can 
make price decisions, making CR-IoT systems analogous to the 
real market. Here, we describe this price decision problem in 
the Bertrand market as a distribute multi-agent dynamic 
resource allocation problem (DMDRAP).  
In DMDRAP, the agents represent network users (PUs and 
SUs). All agents can be considered as two types of agents where 
 
Fig. 2. The interactions learning among PUs and SUs. 
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all PUs are one type of homogeneous agents, and the other SUs 
are another type of homogeneous agents. Therefore, there is a 
competitive relationship between the same categories. 
Furthermore, all agents make price decisions autonomously and 
adaptively. In PUs, each agent’s decision depends not only on 
its own state but also on neighbor agent’s states and policies. In 
general, the states and behaviors of the agents must be 
considered in the reinforcement learning. However, we 
considered the stateless multi-agent Q-learning in our model, 
since the user’s previous states have almost no effects on 
DMDRAP. Each resource allocation does not depend on the 
previous state. The DMDRAP is described as follows. 
In this problem, the PUs and SUs can trade resources under 
the Bertrand market. The SUs are buyers in this market and they 
decide to pay the price of the PUs. The main goal of DMDRAP 
is to develop decision strategies for each agent to maximize the 
benefits and achieve an overall price balance of the entire 
Bertrand market. 
Mathematically, we consider this market model has N PUs 
(P = {𝑝1, 𝑝2, … , 𝑝𝑁}), all PUs submit their prices and they have 
C subchannels. For simplicity, we focus on the scenario of the 
two PUs, which have 2 × C subchannels. And meanwhile, there 
are M SUs (S = {𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑀}) are submitting their bids and 
competing for the spectrum resources in the 2 × C subchannels. 
Then, we introduce the behaviors of the PUs and SUs. 
C. Behaviors of SUs and PUs 
1) The behaviors of SUs 
We consider that each SU as an agent, while other users are 
considered to be external environment. Each agent learns and 
makes price decisions from feedback by interacting with the 
environment and maximize the efficiency of each SU. 
Therefore, the behaviors of the agents should be analyzed and 
an appropriate multi-agent reinforcement learning method 
should be proposed. And the details of these contents are as 
follows. 
As mentioned previously, the SUs are buyers, which give 
bids to compete for the spectrum resources. In general, each SU 
can compete for all subchannel resources of PUs, but each 
subchannel can only be allocated to one SU, otherwise, channel 
conflict will occur. Initially, the SU agents obtain the resource 
status of PUs’. There is a competitive relationship among SUs 
since each agent cannot communicate. During the interaction 
and learning of PUs and SUs, the demands of each SU is 
defined as a set of probabilities in all subchannels resources, as 
D = {𝑑1, 𝑑2, … 𝑑𝑐 , … , 𝑑2𝑐}, (𝑑𝑖ϵ[0,1], ∑ 𝑑𝑖 = 1𝑖 ) . Originally, 
the demand for the subchannel spectrum resources of each SU 
is random. In a forward transaction market, the buyers (SUs) 
bid for subchannels from sellers (PUs). There is a dynamic 
process, the SUs generally updates their strategies based on the 
prices of the PUs design. The bids of SUs are decided to their 
demands for resources because demands represent how much 
they want to pay. Hence, according to the demands of SUs, then 
bids can be obtained by some policy function with 
reinforcement learning, as 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 = π(D).   
However, the demands of agents are always dynamic, so we 
consider that the demands are static for a period of time. During 
this period, bidders can sample and estimate their demands by 
interacting with the PUs, and the trial and error method is 
effective. In other words, within a certain period of time, we can 
measure the difference between the actual demand values and 
the estimated values of the users to evaluate the performance of 
our estimates. 
We denote a  vector 𝐴𝑡
𝑠 = {𝑎1
𝑠,𝑡 , 𝑎2
𝑠,𝑡 , … , 𝑎𝐶
𝑠,𝑡 … , 𝑎2𝐶
𝑠,𝑡}, (𝑎𝑖
𝑠,𝑡 ∈
{0,1}) , which is a set of actions of SUs, and each element 𝑎𝑖
𝑠,𝑡
 
is the SU’s choices of channels at time 𝑡. Generally, the SUs’ 
strategy has three aspects, namely, choosing the PU, selecting 
subchannel resource and bidding on the resources. Bids are 
obtained by an interaction between agents and the environment, 
which are considered as the sample, as 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡
𝑠 ∙ D.  (1) 
In the above formula, the actions is a set of discrete values, 
so the bids here is a set of discrete values based on demands. 
Based on the above interaction, SUs’ revenue can be defined as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝑡
𝑆𝑈 = {
𝑈𝑡 − 𝑏𝑖 ,        𝑖𝑓 𝑏𝑖   𝑖𝑠 max 𝑏𝑖𝑑  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑏𝑖 > 𝑝𝑖       
  −𝑏𝑖 ,                   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                      
（2） 
 
where 𝑈𝑡  is the marginal cost of the resources, for simply 
experiment, we consider 𝑈𝑡 as a constant and 𝑏𝑖 is the bid of SU 
i at time t. It should be noted that the channel resource quality 
of each PU is the same, and the number of subchannels owned 
by PU is the same. The two conditions in the above formula 
indicate that when the SU’s bid is the highest of the same user’s 
bid and is higher than the price of the resource, the channel 
resource will be purchased, so the reward value is positive. 
Conversely, when the price is lower than the price, the reward 
is negative and no resources are not obtained. 
2) The behaviors of PUs  
Because the CR-IoT nodes have the capability of intelligent 
behaviors, which can perceive the environments and make a 
smart decision about the prices of resources. Learning in a 
multi-agent environment is complicated because the 
environment changes effectively as other PUs learn. However, 
in two agents’ Bertrand market environment, an agent PU learn 
to design the prices for the C subchannels, while the other agent 
PU and the SUs are both regarded as a static environment. 
Hence, the above learning process of the agent PU is affected 
by the action of another PUs. In a multi-agent system of two 
PUs, each PU pursues its own target and choose actions 
independently, while there is no communication between PUs. 
In addition, the learning framework between PUs is a general-
sum game framework. 
Obviously, in the market, the PU as a seller, its ideal goal is 
to maximize revenue in a multi-agent system. To achieve this 
goal in the market, PUs design their own resource prices. 
Implementation enables the network nodes to allocate resources 
intelligently. In the interaction between PU and the 
environment, what PU learn from it is turned into their own 
behavior, that is, the designed prices of resources. This learning 
process is actually the process of dealing with SUs’ needs and 
bids. 
Now we analyze behaviors of PUs, the action space, and the 
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reward function for learning price decision policy. Since there 
are two PUs, so the PU’s action is 𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 = {𝑎1
𝑝,𝑡 , 𝑎2
𝑝,𝑡 , … , 𝑎𝐶
𝑝,𝑡} 
and the another PU’s action is 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 = {𝑎𝐶+1
𝑝,𝑡 , 𝑎𝐶+2
𝑝,𝑡 , … , 𝑎2𝐶
𝑝,𝑡} . 
Each PU’s action is the same, that is, their action is to design 
the price based on the interaction with the SUs and to select SUs 
to allocate the resources. There is no communication between 
PUs, but they know each other how to take action in Bertrand 
market. The agent receives feedback from the external 
environment (the SUs) and its neighbor (another PU). Thus, 
other agents’ decision policies affect the agent’s price decision 
policy. The PUs design a set of prices, represented as P =
{𝑃𝑡
1, 𝑃𝑡
2} , where 𝑃𝑡
1 = {𝑝1
1,𝑡 , 𝑝2
1,𝑡 , … , 𝑝𝐶
1,𝑡}, (𝑝𝑖
1,𝑡 ∈ [0,1])  is the 
first PU’s price, and 𝑃𝑡
2 = {𝑝1
2,𝑡 , 𝑝2
2,𝑡 , … , 𝑝𝐶
2,𝑡}, (𝑝𝑖
2,𝑡 ∈ [0,1]) is 
the another PU’s price. The behavior of PUs is to allocate 
channel resources according to the bid of SUs, and the users 
with high bids obtain resources. We assume that there is a 
standard that each SU obtains only one channel resource. To 
motivate agents to achieve the goal of balancing market prices, 
supplies and demands, the PUs are using the same reward 
functions to learn. Each PU receives a positive reward in 
learning episode. This reward is given by the function: 
 
R𝑡
𝑃𝑈 = ∑ (𝑟𝑡
𝑃𝑈𝑖)𝑖∈[1,2] .  (3) 
 
where 𝑟𝑡
𝑃𝑈𝑖 is the reward of agent PU and R𝑡
𝑃𝑈 is the sum of 
two agents. The reward 𝑟𝑡
𝑃𝑈𝑖 is defined as follows: 
 
𝑟𝑡
𝑃𝑈𝑖 = max{𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 − P − 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 , 0}.  (4) 
 
In Bertrand market, we assume that marginal cost is constant. 
Hence, when ignoring cost (𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 0), we simplify the formula 
to calculate the maximum reward of PU. Based on the Bertrand 
market model above, the revenue of the whole multiagent 
system to be maximized, that is, maximize R𝑡
𝑃𝑈. Therefore, the 
policy of one PU is adjusted based on interaction and feedback 
with another PU and the SUs. When the number of users 
seeking to purchase is too small and the supply of resources 
exceeds demand, the price of the resource should be 
appropriately reduced. On the contrary, when there are too 
many users and demand exceeds supply, the price should be 
appropriately increased to make the entire market equilibrium 
and curb the development of monopoly industries. 
In a dealer market, there is a problem for the market seller 
(PUs) and buyers (SUs) learn how to deals their bids and judge 
whether the prices are acceptable. Specifically, this issue is a 
question of pricing policy decisions. Reinforcement learning is 
a method to solve decision problems. Therefore, in the next 
section, we will propose the details of the Q-probabilistic multi-
agent algorithm to solve the price decision problem. 
IV. Q-PROBABILISTIC MULTIAGENT LEARNING METHOD 
We study the phenomenon of price decision problem in the 
CR-IoT market model of agents’ interaction. We use the 
Bertrand market model, which is an interesting and dynamic 
multi-agent system. Our model is based on the framework of a 
general-sum stochastic game in which each agent’s payoff also 
depends on other agents’ policy. We are interested in the 
equilibrium price in the Bertrand market model because we 
want to design learning agents in resource allocation problem 
that can learn allocation policies, adaptively.  
In a single-agent system, reinforcement learning algorithms, 
such as Q-learning, is usually used to address a problem like a 
resource allocation in a monopolistic market. Also, in a multi-
agent system, the multiagent reinforcement learning (MARL) 
algorithms have been developed to address the problem of 
resource allocation in CR-IoT. To address DMDRAP, we 
proposed a multiagent reinforcement learning algorithm, called 
Q-probabilistic multiagent learning (QPML). The QPML can 
solve the problem of resource allocation in an oligopolistic 
market. We consider a probabilistic policy to control the actions 
of PUs and SUs. 
In single-agent reinforcement learning, the Q-learning 
algorithm is the off-policy approach, which is very popular. Its 
target is to update Q-value, which is defined as the follows: 
 
Q(s, a) = (1 − α)Q(s, a) + α[r + β max
𝑏
𝑄(𝑠′, 𝑏)].  (5) 
 
where α is the learning rate, β is the discount factor and r is the 
reward. The 𝑄(𝑠′, 𝑏) is a future state-action pair. Generally, α 
determines whether convergence, convergence speed, and 
accuracy of expectation, which is a trade-off value. In the 
learning process, the state-action pair that leads to higher 
reward will be reinforced. 
In multi-agent Q-learning, we not only maximize our own Q-
values but also consider joint optimization since the one agent’s 
Q-value also depend on other agents. In a multi-agent system, 
the rules for updating the Q-values are as follows: 
 
𝑄1(s, 𝑎1, 𝑎2) = (1 − α)Q(s, 𝑎1, 𝑎2) + α[𝑟1 +
β𝜋1(𝑠′)𝑄1(𝑠′)𝜋1(𝑠′)].   (6) 
 
𝑄2(s, 𝑎1, 𝑎2) = (1 − α)Q(s, 𝑎1, 𝑎2) + α[𝑟2 +
β𝜋1(𝑠′)𝑄2(𝑠′)𝜋2(𝑠′)].     (7) 
 
where the α is the learning rate and β is the discount factor, 𝑟1 
is the reward of agent 1,  𝑟2  is the reward of agent 2. Here, 
(𝜋1, 𝜋2) is the strategy function of 𝑃𝑈1 and 𝑃𝑈2 respectively, 
and the (𝑄1(𝑠′), 𝑄2(𝑠′)) is a biomatrix game policy. Therefore, 
each agent maintains two Q tables that the one is its own Q table 
and the other is another agent’s Q table. Furthermore, each PU 
can observe the rewards and previous actions of other PUs 
during the learning period.  
In this paper, a scenario with 2C subchannels is considered 
where there are two PUs and multiple SUs. Each PU has 2𝐶 −
1 states and actions. Also, each PU learns two Q tables, each of 
them has (2𝐶 − 1)2 elements. In such a large state and action 
space, we consider using stateless Q-probabilistic multi-agent 
algorithm. 
As mentioned previously, we considered the stateless multi-
agent Q-learning in our model, since each resource allocation 
does not depend on the previous states. Algorithm 1 describes 
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the QPML policy update process, in which we adopt the 
stateless Q-learning in the learning process of PUs, as follows: 
 
𝑄𝑡+1
1 (𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 ) = 𝑄𝑡
1(𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 ) + α[r𝑃
1 − 𝑄𝑡
1(𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 )].  (8) 
 
𝑄𝑡+1
2 (𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 ) = 𝑄𝑡
2(𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 ) + α[r𝑃
2 − 𝑄𝑡
2(𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 )].  (9) 
 
where 𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝
 is a set of actions of PU1 and 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝
 is a set of actions 
of PU2 . The  r𝑃
1  is the reward of PU1  and r𝑃
2  is the reward of 
PU2 . Furthermore, the 𝑄𝑡
1  and 𝑄𝑡
2  are the Q value of PU1  and 
PU2. For two PUs, the action space is 2 × |A|
2, here, we assume 
|𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 | = |𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝 | = |A|. Similar to that of the PUs’, the stateless 
Q-learning is also adopted in SUs learning, the following rule 
is used to update Q-value function: 
 
𝑄𝑡+1(𝐴𝑡
𝑆) = 𝑄𝑡 (𝐴𝑡
𝑆) + α[𝑟𝑆 − 𝑄𝑡 (𝐴𝑡
𝑆)].   (10) 
 
where 𝐴𝑡
𝑆 donates a set of action of SUs, that is the bids of the 
SUs. Here, the action (bids) in Q-learning is stochastic and the 
Q value is not probabilistic, to assure that all actions will be 
converted to a probabilistic form. We consider Boltzmann 
distribution to normalize the Q-value, as 
 
P =
𝑒
𝑄𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑡 (𝑎)
𝜏
⁄
∑ 𝑒
𝑄𝑖𝑗,𝑘
𝑡 (𝑎)
𝜏
⁄
𝑖
  (11) 
 
here 𝑄𝑖𝑗
𝑡 (𝑎) is the Q-value for action a when SU i select channel 
k of the PU j  (𝑗 ∈ (1,2)) at time t. The τ is a temperature 
parameter, which controls the fluctuation of this Boltzmann 
distribution. Hence, we use P  as the estimated demand D̂  to 
control the actions of agents. In addition, we use KL divergence 
to measure the difference between the demand D and estimate 
value D̂.  
The KL divergence is a method used to describe the 
difference between the probability,  D and estimate value D̂ as 
follows: 
 
K(𝐷‖?̂?) = ∑ 𝐷𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝐷
?̂?
𝑛
𝑖=1    (12) 
where D is the true demand distribution of SUs and D̂ is the 
estimated distribution. Then K(𝐷‖?̂?)  represents the relative 
entropy of D to D̂, that is, the similarity estimation when D is 
fitted to D̂. During the learning process, we present the details 
learning methods for SUs and PUs, respectively. 
A. Learning procedure of SUs 
Based on the behaviors of the SUs and the QPML algorithm 
depicted above, the details of the learning method of SUs will 
be introduced as follows. In the Bertrand market, each SU bids 
to compete for the spectrum resources of two PUs. When the 
SU selects one subchannel, the action is 1, Otherwise 0. Each 
SU has a selection probability, and this value is determined by 
the Boltzmann distribution in the QPML algorithm. 
In the market, SUs are enough active buyers who trade of 
high liquidity with PUs. Each SU submits its bid, which aims 
to obtain as many resources as possible. Then, PUs receive the 
SUs’ bids and determine whether to accept the incoming bids 
and resource asks. The market PU can accept a bid from SUs 
when bid exceeds the PU’s price. Then, the resource allocation 
can be executed right after the moment that a bid and an ask are 
matched in a trading. Otherwise, the ask of SU is rejected and 
the trade is over. In the multi-agent system of the market, the 
environment is made up of SUs and PUs, and the learning 
process of SUs and PUs is closed-loop. The SU’s reward comes 
from PU, and PUs receives SU’s feedback during the learning 
process, which is an interactive process. Algorithm 2 shows the 
price decision-making process of SUs, which repeats at each 
epoch. 
B. Learning procedure of SUs 
Formally, in our multi-agent market model, the PU’s price 
not only depends on their own behaviors but also depends on 
another agent’s actions. When designing two learning agents, 
we must consider what information is available to agents, such 
as preference, price vector and another agent’s action. We 
assume an agent PU can observe the actions of other agents 
(whether resources are allocated). 
ALGORITHM 1 
Algorithm 1: Q-probabilistic multiagent learning (QPML) Algorithm 
begin 
 Initialization: 
 t= 0,  
 All action of multi-agent 
 Random initialization Q-value 
 Loop  
  Foreach action  
  Calculate rewards 
  update Q-value function, respectively  
 end 
 let t=t+1 
end 
 
ALGORITHM 2 
Algorithm 2: QPML for SU learning procedure 
begin 
 Initialization: 
 t= 0,   
 𝐴𝑡
𝑆 is other agents’ action, P is a probabilistic form of Q-value 
 Random initialization: 𝑄𝑡+1(𝐴𝑡
𝑆) 
 for each period 𝑡 
  Calculate P as (11) 
  Choose action 𝐴𝑡
𝑠, according to P 
  Calculate 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 as (1) 
  Calculate rewards as (2) 
  𝑟𝑆 ←the reward for action 𝐴𝑡
𝑆 of other agents 
  foreach action 𝐴𝑡
𝑠 do 
   Update Q-value function as (10) 
  end 
 End  
 Calculate KL divergence as (12) 
end 
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Initially, the prices of the resources are generated randomly, 
which is in [0,1]. We assume that the quantity and quality of 
resources owned by two PUs are the same for each time period. 
During a learning process, the prices of PUs’ resources are 
constantly changing. That is, the PUs update price strategies to 
change the prices during the learning process. Specifically, the 
price is adjusted according to the difference between the 
maximum bid of each subchannel and actual price. When 
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 − P ≥ 0, the PU allocate resource to SUs, otherwise, the 
trade is failed. When the trade fails, the PU should consider 
adjusting their own designed prices. Each PU has two update 
rules, which are to increase prices and lower prices.  
As mentioned previously, there are M SUs, we assume 𝑀1 
SUs obtain resource of 𝑃𝑈1 and 𝑀2 SUs obtain resource of 𝑃𝑈2, 
where 𝑀1 + 𝑀2 ≤ 𝑀. We denote 𝑝1,𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
1  and 𝑝2,𝑡 =
𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡
2, and when 𝑝1,𝑡 > 0, denote as 𝑝1,𝑡
+ , otherwise denote 
as 𝑝1,𝑡
− . When 
𝑀1
𝑀
≥
𝑀2
𝑀
, the transaction success rate of 𝑃𝑈1on 
the market is greater than  𝑃𝑈2. In the next round of trading, 
𝑃𝑈1  will continue to raise its prices in order to obtain more 
benefits. In contrast, 𝑃𝑈2  will lower its prices to get more 
buyers. However, 𝑃𝑈1  may also continue to suppress prices, 
which is a malicious competition in the market. In this paper, 
we don’t consider the malicious competition. Then, 𝑃𝑈1 update 
Q-value function as the following rule: 
 
𝑄𝑡+1
1 (𝑝1,𝑡
+ , 𝑝2,𝑡
− ) = 𝑄𝑡
1(𝑝1,𝑡
+ , 𝑝2,𝑡
− ) + α[r𝑃
1 − 𝑄𝑡
1(𝑝1,𝑡
+ , 𝑝2,𝑡
− )].   (13) 
 
The 𝑃𝑈2 update Q-value function as the following rule: 
 
   𝑄𝑡+1
2 (𝑝1,𝑡
+ , 𝑝2,𝑡
− ) = 𝑄𝑡
2(𝑝1,𝑡
+ , 𝑝2,𝑡
− ) + α[−r𝑃
2 − 𝑄𝑡
2(𝑝1,𝑡
+ , 𝑝2,𝑡
− )].  (14) 
 
When 
𝑀1
𝑀
<
𝑀2
𝑀
, 𝑃𝑈1 will lower its prices and 𝑃𝑈2 will raise its 
prices. The 𝑃𝑈1 update Q-value function as the following rule: 
 
   𝑄𝑡+1
1 (𝑝1,𝑡
− , 𝑝2,𝑡
+ ) = 𝑄𝑡
1(𝑝1,𝑡
− , 𝑝2,𝑡
+ ) + α[−r𝑃
1 − 𝑄𝑡
1(𝑝1,𝑡
− , 𝑝2,𝑡
+ )].  (15) 
 
The 𝑃𝑈2 update Q-value function as the following rule: 
 
 𝑄𝑡+1
2 (𝑝1,𝑡
− , 𝑝2,𝑡
+ ) = 𝑄𝑡
2(𝑝1,𝑡
− , 𝑝2,𝑡
+ ) + α[r𝑃
2 − 𝑄𝑡
2(𝑝1,𝑡
− , 𝑝2,𝑡
+ )].  (16) 
 
Algorithm 3 shows the learning process of 𝑃𝑈1and 𝑃𝑈2, which 
repeats at each epoch. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
In this section, we present experimental to evaluate our 
proposed Q-probabilistic multi-agent learning method. Our 
experiments are based on a Window 10 operating system 
(Intel(R) Core™ i5-7200U CPU @ 2.50GHz 2.71GHz). 
In Bertrand market model, two PUs interact with many SUs. 
From a market perspective of the Bertrand model, in order to 
achieve a balance of the resource market, our agent PUs have 
the same quality resources. Initially, the prices of the two PUs’ 
resources are random (prices are higher than costs), and then 
during the learning process, the two PUs change the price 
decisions based on interaction with the multi-agent 
environment. The Bertrand model can better describe strategies 
choice because quantity decisions are generated immediately by 
price choices. The goal of our agents’ learning is to determine 
prices and maximize personal interests in the short term, but the 
long-term goal is to balance the Bertrand market.  
In our experiments, we explored agents’ behaviors strategies 
learning separately and tracked the benefits of each SU and PU  
We have tested the MAQL approach on multiple CR-IoT 
network models with different numbers of SUs and different 
numbers of channels, all of which show similar results, but 
there are also significant differences. Here, we provide detailed 
results of the users’ revenues with the three cases in Table 1, 
the experimental results as shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.  
Next, we analyze the different effects of the experiments in 
three cases. 
Case 1: In this case, we have 10 SUs and 2 PUs. We set the 
three different channel resources for each PU: (a) 600 channels, 
ALGORITHM 3 
Algorithm 3: QPML for PU learning procedure 
begin 
 Initialization: 
 t= 0, 
 All 𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝
 is 𝑃𝑈1’s action, 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝
 is 𝑃𝑈2’s action 
 Random initialization: 𝑄𝑡+11 (𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝
), 𝑄𝑡+1
2 (𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝
) 
 For each period 𝑡 
  Input bids of SUs 
  Calculate payoff  𝑝1,𝑡, 𝑝2,𝑡   
  Obtain the reward 𝑟𝑡
𝑃𝑈𝑖 as (4) 
           r𝑃2 ←the reward for action 𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝
 of 𝑃𝑈1 
           r𝑃1 ←the reward for action 𝐴1,𝑡
𝑝 , 𝐴2,𝑡
𝑝
 of 𝑃𝑈2 
  if 
𝑀1
𝑀
≥
𝑀2
𝑀
 then 
   update 𝑃𝑈1 Q-value function as (13) 
   update 𝑃𝑈2 Q-value function as (14) 
  else 
   when 
𝑀1
𝑀
<
𝑀2
𝑀
, 
   update 𝑃𝑈1 Q-value function as (15), 
   update 𝑃𝑈2 Q-value function as (16) 
  end 
 end 
end 
 
TABLE 1 
THE THREE CASES INDIFFERENT DYNASTIC ENVIRONMENTS 
CASE NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 
CASE1 
(M=10) 
𝐶1 = 600 
𝐶2 = 600 
𝐶1 = 300 
𝐶2 = 300 
𝐶1 = 100 
𝐶2 = 100 
CASE2 
(M=20) 
𝐶1 = 600 
𝐶2 = 600 
𝐶1 = 300 
𝐶2 = 300 
𝐶1 = 100 
𝐶2 = 100 
CASE3 
(M=50) 
𝐶1 = 600 
𝐶2 = 600 
𝐶1 = 300 
𝐶2 = 300 
𝐶1 = 100 
𝐶2 = 100 
The M represents the numbers of SUs, 𝐶1 represents the numbers of 𝑃𝑈1’s 
channels, the 𝐶2 represents the numbers of 𝑃𝑈2’s channels 
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(b) 300 channels, (c) 100 channels. As shown in Fig. 3 (a), (b), 
    
(a) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 600 , 𝐶2 = 600 
    
(b) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 300 , 𝐶2 = 300 
    
(c) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 100 , 𝐶2 = 100 
Fig. 3.  Case 1.The average rewards for PUs , the efficiency of SUs’ bids, and the average revenue convergence curve in the market (the number of SUs is N=10). 
 
    
(a) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 600 , 𝐶2 = 600 
    
(b) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 300 , 𝐶2 = 300 
    
(c) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 100 , 𝐶2 = 100 
Fig. 4. Case 2. The average rewards for PUs, the efficiency of SUs’ bids, and the average revenue convergence curve in the market (the number of SUs is N=20). 
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(c), these figures show the average rewards of 𝑃𝑈1 and 𝑃𝑈2 , 
also show the efficiency of SUs’ bids during the learning 
process. It can be clearly seen that at first PUs’ average rewards 
are very small, and as the numbers of trade increases, their 
rewards gradually improve. We carefully analyze the behavior 
of PU and SU in the four sets of images in Fig. 3 (a). The trend 
of other group diagrams is similar. 
As shown in the first and second figure of Fig. 3 (a), In the 
PUs’ learning process, each time the SUs bid is received, and 
then the profit is calculated based on the market price of the 
design. As the price changes from one iteration to the next, each 
PU’s revenues in the process is also constantly changing. But 
the total average revenues will converge to the value. This 
simulation result indicates that the optimal price design of 
resource can be learned in a Bertrand market model. 
The third image of Fig. 3 (a) depicts a long-term efficiency 
of SUs’ bidding in multi-agent environments. SUs mainly learn 
to make bids based on whether or not the feedback information 
of the resources is obtained, and the pricing behavior of each 
SU is different. We averaged the rewards for SUs in the curve 
and analyzed the overall benefits of pricing. As can be seen 
from the figure, the overall benefit closes to be a value when 
the iteration is displayed about 600 iterations on the horizontal 
axis. The number of iterations on the horizontal axis on the chart 
represents one run of the trade. 
The last graph in Fig. 3 (a) is the average revenue of all users 
in the market. The red line， the blue line and the green line 
represent the revenues of SUs, 𝑃𝑈1   and 𝑃𝑈2 , respectively. 
From this figure, as the number of iterations was increased, the 
three curves gradually converge. The convergence is within 600 
iterations. Here, one iteration means one complete strategy 
updates for all users. After 600 iterations, the three curves closer 
    
(a) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 600 , 𝐶2 = 600 
    
(b) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 300 , 𝐶2 = 300 
    
(c) the numbers of PUs’ channels are 𝐶1 = 100 , 𝐶2 = 100 
Fig. 5. Case 3. The average rewards for PUs, the efficiency of SUs’ bids, and the average revenue convergence curve in the market (the number of SUs is N=50). 
 
TABLE 2 
THE CONVERGENCE VALUE 
CASE C PU1 PU2 SUs 
CASE1 
(M=10) 
100 1.00 ± 0.01 1.06 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.00 
300 0.64 ± 0.01 0.68 ± 0.00 0.62 ± 0.01 
600 0.42 ± 0.01 0.44 ± 0.01 0.41 ± 0.00 
CASE2 
(M=20) 
100 1.14 ± 0.00 1.24 ± 0.01 0.94 ± 0.01 
300 0.89 ± 0.01 0.94 ± 0.01 0.82 ± 0.00 
600 0.62 ± 0.01 0.66 ± 0.01 0.6 ± 0.00 
CASE3 
(M=50) 
100 1.25 ± 0.00 1.36 ± 0.01 0.97 ± 0.00 
300 1.10 ± 0.00 1.18 ± 0.01 0.93 ± 0.01 
600 0.90 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.01 0.83 ± 0.00 
M represents the numbers of SUs, C represents the numbers of a PU. 
 
Fig. 6. The KL divergence of   SUs’ demands. 
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to their own optimal value, respectively. It shows that our 
algorithm converges. 
Fig. 3 (b) and (c) also depicts the users’ rewards and the 
average revenue of users in the market. The behaviors of SUs 
and PUs are similar to that described previously, but their 
rewards, market revenues, and convergence times are all 
different. 
In Fig.4 and Fig.5 of the Case 2 and Case 3, respectively, the 
behaviors of SUs and PUs are similar for the case 1. We 
summarize the results of the final convergence values in the 
three cases in Table 2, and then analyzed the behaviors of users 
in the market under different conditions.  
The conclusions we observed are as follows: (1) We observe 
that the number of users is the same, the smaller the number of 
channels, and the greater the average market revenue and the 
user’s personal reward. For example, in case 1, the number of 
SUs is 10, when 𝑃𝑈1   and 𝑃𝑈2  all have 100 channels, their 
average reward and SU’s bidding efficiency are the best. It can 
be seen from this that the smaller the number of resources in the 
market, the greater the market gain. And resources are allocated 
reasonably to SUs, no waste. If the amount of resources is too 
large, it will become cheaper and the overall market income will 
decrease. (2) In three cases, our algorithm does not reduce its 
performance as the number of users increases. For example, 
when the number of channels is 600, the convergence iterations 
of the algorithm in the three cases are about 500 iterations. This 
proves that the fullness of market users will not affect our 
resource allocation. (3) As the number of SUs increases, the 
average reward for PUs and SUs increases gradually, indicating 
that our algorithm can allocate resources and maximize market 
efficiency in the high-volume user market. The more users, the 
better the performance of the algorithm. 
In addition, in order to verify the validity of the ability of the 
SUs to estimate demand after interacting with the dynamic 
environment, we propose to use KL divergence to calculate the 
similarity between the probability distribution of demand D and 
estimated value D̂ . As illustrated in Fig. 6, it plots the KL 
divergence curve between the original resources demand 
distribution of the SUs and the estimated resources distribution 
of agents’ online learning. The curve fluctuates dynamically 
between the value of 1.7 and 1.9. It can be seen that the KL 
divergence of the actual demand and the estimated demand is 
small, so their similarity is greater. Therefore, it is effective to 
estimate the demand function using the Boltzmann distribution 
normalized Q value.  
In the proposed multi-agent learning method, both PUs know 
each other behaviors and benefits, so they can determine the 
price that can bring the most profit for themselves, that is, each 
user will adjust their own prices. These prices adapt to the price 
of other users on the market. It can be indicated by the above 
experimental results that the proposed method is effective in the 
multiple users’ scenario of CR-IoT, and the implementation of 
the method suppresses the monopolistic behavior of the 
merchants in the resource market and maintains the market 
balance. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper has proposed the use of the Q-probabilistic 
multiagent learning to solve dynamic resource allocation 
problem in a sophisticated market model. From the perspective 
of economic theory, we have tackled a distribute multi-agent 
dynamic resource allocation problem. Each learning agent PU 
can observe the behavior of other PUs, which design their own 
resource price in Bertrand market model. Also, the SUs 
compete for resources by bidding. The empirical results of this 
paper plausibly suggest that the interactive learning between 
multi-agent SUs and PUs is a promising method for balancing 
market price, optimizing resource allocation and suppressing 
monopolistic behavior in resource market. In this paper, we 
have only designed a multi-agent system with two PUs and 
multiple SUs in CR-IoT, but can be extended to n-PUs scenario 
in future work. 
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